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SECURING, EXAMINING, AND CROSS-
EXAMINING EXPERT WITNESSES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
David Sive* 
IT is a known lawyer's joke, kept carefully from laymen, that if a lawyer does a particular job once, he may deem himself an 
expert. This observation is even more applicable to the litigation of 
environmental matters than it is to matters such as chapter XI ar-
rangement proceedings, Securities and Exchange Commission regis-
tration statements, or most other fields of acknowledged legal ex-
pertise. The reason is self-evident: The field is so new. The number 
of cases from which to draw one's experience is small, and the variety 
of fora and consequently of applicable procedural codes is large. The 
present situation may not be different from that existing in other 
fields of law which are currently in an evolutionary stage: midway 
between, at the one extreme, the stage of borrowing most of their 
substantive and procedural doctrines from already delineated areas 
of law, and, at the other extreme, the stage when they are recognized 
as separate bodies of law, with their own doctrines, their own chap-
ters in the encyclopedias, and their O'Wn law school courses. 
In light of the newness of the field and the paucity of experience 
among its practitioners, it becomes apparent that the characteriza-
tion of a fawyer as an expert in this area is often the result much less 
of talent than of a fondness for the wild woods. But despite the fact 
that few lawyers have had any extensive experience in environ-
mental litigation, lawyers will be called on more and more fre-
quently in the coming years to try cases involving environmental 
matters.1 One of the problems that these lawyers will face, partic-
ularly if they are inexperienced in this area, is that of making effec-
tive use of expert witnesses; indeed, the use of expert witnesses in 
environmental litigation involv~s problems which lawyers have 
seldom faced in other fields of litigation. Accordingly-recognizing 
that this author's expertise stems primarily from a fondness for 
• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1943, Brooklyn College; LL.B. 1948, Columbia 
University. Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation, Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York; Executive Director, Committee on Natural Re-
sources and Agriculture, 1967 New York State Constitutional Convention.-Ed. 
The author would like to express his gratitude to Albert Butzel, Esq., New York 
City, for his very helpful comments and criticisms. 
1. For a thorough discussion of such cases, see Sax, Public Rights in Public Re-
sources: The Citizen's Role in Conservation and Development, in CONTEMPORARY DE-
VELOPMENTS IN WATER LAW 136 (C. Johnson&: s. Lewis eds. 1970). 
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nature-this Article will explore the practicalities involved in secur-
ing, examining, and cross-examining expert witnesses in "environ-
mental litigation." 
I . .APOLOGIA 
A. Scope of the Problem 
It is necessary at the outset to define the scope of the problem 
with which this Article will deal. Environmental cases are litigated 
in both judicial and administrative tribunals. The judicial pro-
ceedings include plenary actions and special proceedings2 and are 
heard in both federal and state courts. The administrative proceed-
ings include licensing proceedings before federal agencies such as the 
Federal Power Commission and Atomic Energy Commission.3 
Whether such administrative proceedings are deemed quasi-judicial 
or not, they are within the scope of this Article so long as they are 
adversary4 and involve testimony under oath, examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, a formal record of testimonial and docu-
mentary evidence, and findings and conclusions based solely on that 
record. Of course, many legislative bodies and committees, as well as 
administrative agencies, conduct nonadversary "hearings" with for-
mal records. Such hearings often involve the testimony and state-
ments of large numbers of renowned experts, and a strong case can 
be made for urging that they are better instruments for ascertaining 
truth and wisdom than are adversary proceedings. 5 The focus of this 
2. The most important type of special proceedings is statutory review of de• 
terminations by agencies such as the Federal Power Commission or the Atomic Energy 
Commission. See Administrative Procedure Act § IO, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964); Federal 
Power Act § 313, 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1964); Atomic Energy Act § 189, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 
(1964). 
3. Federal Power Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Atomic Energy Act §§ 101-10, 42 
u.s.c. §§ 2131-40 (1964). 
4. Proceedings before administrative bodies may not be completely adversary in 
the sense that the agency plays a merely passive role. The agency's duty may be "an 
affirmative duty to inquire into and consider all relevant facts." Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 
(1966); accord, Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), 
afjd., 342 U.S. 950 (1952). This aflinnative duty was described further in Scenic Hud-
son: 
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to be the repre-
sentative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an umpire 
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of 
the public must receive active and aflinnative protection at the hands of the 
Commission. 
354 F.2d at 620. :Both the decision of the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson and the 
prior and subsequent proceedings before the Federal Power Commission are referred 
to as the "Storm King proceedings." 
5. In environmental matters, frequently involving broad questions of economic and 
social policy, ~e b11Sic question often ijrlse§ whether an adversary proceeding or a leg-
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Article, however, is solely on proceedings which are adversary in 
nature and which involve the procedural aspects described above. 
It is also necessary to examine the "environmental" nature of the 
litigation with which this Article is concerned. First, the Article 
deals with proceedings which determine the disposition or use of 
natural resources or aspects of our natural environment. Second, it 
is concerned only ·with the problems of, and it looks at the subject 
matter only through the eyes of, the conservationist who is attempt-
ing to protect the resource or environment from one special disposi-
tion, use, or claim. This limitation to the problems of the "pro-
tectors" is perhaps contrary to tradition as well as injudicious. Such 
limitation is absolutely necessary, however, because the problems of 
the two sides are as vastly different from one another as the refining 
of the pebbles in David's sling was different from the buildup of the 
might of Goliath's brawn. 
The limitation to the problems of the "protectors" also de-
lineates the party position of the client who is the focus of the dis-
cussion here. That delineation is important, for one's party position 
has significant procedural consequences in this area.6 In a plenary 
action, characteristically an action for a declaratory judgment and 
an injunction, the party position of the conservationist is generally 
that of the plaintiff. In an administrative proceeding, the relevant 
position is usually that of an opposing intervenor, that is, one op-
posing or seeking to condition the grant of a license to use a re-
source. Thus, the various procedural possibilities in these cases nec-
essarily dictate that one's policy as to the use of expert witnesses be 
flexible in order to be effective. 
B. Necessity for Using Expert Witnesses 
It is essential, too, before dealing with the practical problems 
which are the primary focus of this Article, to examine briefly why 
expert witnesses should be used at all in environmental cases. The 
traditional role of the expert witness has been to assist adjudicatory 
bodies in finding out the "truth" in any given matter. The role has 
been molded by two primary factors: (I) the specific area about 
which the expert testifies is one in which he is in fact an expert, and 
(2) the area is beyond the average layman's scope of comprehension. 
islative or other nonadversary type of proceeding is best adapted to discover ultimate 
truth and wisdom. See generally J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND Poucy 308-59 
(1968); Comment, Of Birds, Bees, and the FPC, 77 YALE L.J. 117 (1967). That problem, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
6. One important consequence is the general priority of the opposite party, the 
defendant, in the taking of depositions. See text accompanying note 25 infra. 
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The expert witness, then, provides knowledge which he, because of 
his training, has acquired and which would not be brought out or 
understood without his testimony. The lawyer for the conservation-
ists in an environmental litigation should realize from the beginning 
that expert witnesses can be just as valuable in this type of case as 
in cases involving complex scientific data.7 The reasons for the im-
portance of utilizing expert testimony in such cases are many. The 
expert witness usually knows far more about the type of case at hand 
than does the lawyer, who, as has been pointed out, generally has 
had little experience in this area. Thus, at the very least, the expert 
can quickly give the lawyer basic background knowledge about the 
specific problem; this knowledge will, of course, provide much of 
the theoretical framework within which the lawyer will prepare his 
practical legal strategy. It is fundamental that the more the lawyer 
really understands about various factors and problems present in any 
one case, the more able he will be to present as good a case as pos-
sible for his client. 
In addition, in many cases, the expert witness can fulfill the tradi-
tional role of the expert-that of enlightening others on subjects 
which they could not fully grasp on their own. In this regard the 
expert may be crucial to the "protectors' " case. A court may not 
understand why, simply to "save the environment," it should enjoin 
the government from building a highway through a marsh or 
swamp. Indeed, to issue such an injunction on such vague grounds 
might well seem to a court to be a "step against progress." But the 
same court may at least weigh the competing considerations if an 
expert explains the fundamental theory of the delicate eco-system 
present in such a marsh. In some environmental cases, then, the 
expert, simply by fulfilling his traditional role, can make a vast dif-
ference in the outcome of the litgiation. 
The expert witness can also play a vital role in cases in which 
the question involved is more of aesthetics than of upsetting the 
balance of nature.8 In such cases, expert testimony is, by definition, 
far less precise because of the more subjective nature of his ex-
pertise. It is a much more difficult proposition, it seems, to produce 
expert testimony on the aesthetics of natural resources than it is to 
produce such testimony on the ecological balance present in a 
stream. Yet there are two reasons why such evidence should be intro-
7. See note 34 infra and accompanying text. See generally J. SAX, WATER I.Aw, 
PLANNING AND POLICY 314-16, 323, 328, 333-34 (1970) (reprinting portions of the briefs 
in the Storm King proceedings that deal with scientific and technical issues). 
8. See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text. 
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duced. First, any testimony, whether aestheic or scientific, seems 
more influential if given by an "expert." Thus, as a matter of 
strategy, testimony as to aesthetics should be given by experts, for 
no matter how subjective their opinions in reality are, the very fact 
that the witnesses are introduced as experts would appear to imply 
objectivity in their critical standards. Second, such testimony may be 
helpful simply in articulating, in the best possible language, the 
"protectors' " position. A teacher of the fine arts, for example, is 
likely to be far more poetic, and thus, it is hoped, persuasive, in his 
description of aesthetic values than would someone who does not 
have his background, training, and interest in that field. For these 
reasons, the attorney for the "protectors" in any environmental 
litigation should secure and use expert witnesses at the earliest pos-
sible stage of the proceedings. 
It is in light of the foregoing considerations that this Article will 
discuss the effective use of expert witnesses in environmental cases. 
Specifically, the Article will deal with five aspects of the problem: 
(1) selecting, securing, and compensating the expert witness; (2) the 
availability and conduct of discovery proceedings; (3) preparing the 
witness' direct testimony; (4) preparing the witness for cross-exam-
ination; and (5) the conduct of the examination and cross-examina-
tion at the hearing or trial. 
II. SELECTING, SECURING, AND COMPENSATING THE EXPERT 
The initial problem in utilizing expert testimony is, of course, 
that of finding a competent expert witness. Since conservation 
groups are often concentrated very heavily in college and university 
communities, it is there that many good expert witnesses may be 
found. Thus, the conservationists' lawyer should open, and keep 
open, as many avenues of contact as possible with nearby academic 
communities. Other useful sources of expert witnesses are the 
various conservation societies which are rapidly multiplying. A cata-
logue of the various fields of expertise which members of these 
organizations may possess is of great help. Such a catalogue can be 
compiled and maintained through the use of questionnaires peri-
odically sent to members. The conservationists' lawyer should con-
tinually be enlarging and updating these files of potential witnesses. 
He should also be in constant contact with other conservationist 
lawyers so that as large a pool of common knowledge as possible is 
built up. "Protectors" have a common cause and should assist one 
another as much as possible in the pooling of pertinent information. 
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Once a competent expert is found, the next problem is securing 
his services for trial. The primary problem in securing the services 
of an expert is often money. Protectors of resources and their 
lawyers, with very rare exceptions, simply cannot go out into the 
market and pay the arms' length fees of experts, since such experts 
generally receive from three hundred to seven hundred fifty dollars 
per day plus expenses. Fortunately, there are numerous experts who 
are willing to contribute their time without charge because they 
are dedicated to the cause of conservation. That dedication exists to 
an inspiring degree among surprisingly large numbers of expert 
physical and social scientists and others who are officers, employees, 
or merely members of major conservation organizations or citizens' 
groups which attempt to protect our nation's resources.9 Thus, in 
many environmental cases, the conservationists are able to procure 
expert testimony without having to pay high fees, simply because the 
expert witnesses are themselves "protectors" and believe strongly 
enough in the cause they are advancing not to try to reap large 
personal gains from their efforts in the case. 
Another helpful factor in persuading an expert witness to testify, 
even though he can be paid very little, is that environmental litiga-
tion is a matter of wide public importance and concern. Expert 
testimony in an important environmental litigation is a mark of 
prestige in almost anyone's curriculum vitae, although many persons 
who have rendered great service in such cases hardly need any such 
additional credentials. It is no derogation of the nobility and selfless-
ness of those who have given many whole days and weeks, with no or 
ridiculously small compensation, to point out that such recognition 
may be helpful to the expert witnesses in intangible ways. 
Balancing the advantages of dedication and evangelism against 
those of money, it appears that when the expert testimony is con-
cerned with the resources or planning issue per se and thus requires 
less background data than does more technical testimony, the con-
servationist lawyer is fully as able to secure expert witnesses and 
testimony as is the opposition.10 When the testimony is more tech-
nical in nature, however, the conservationists' zeal cannot match the 
opposition's dollars. 
9. In the Storm King proceedings, for example, several scientists, professors, and 
conservationists were willing to testify for the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
and the Sierra Club without compensation, including Vincent Scully, Charles Callison, 
Richard Pough, David Browder, and Richard Edes Harrison. See note 34 infra. 
IO. See note 9 supra and note 34 infra and accompanying text. 
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In this connection, the conservationist lawyer should be aware 
of the tax consequences to the expert if that expert offers to testify. 
The question is often asked whether the expert may deduct the 
value of his services against income, as a charitable deduction. The 
answer is clearly that he may not. The explanation is simple: if the 
compensation were actually received, it would be ordinary income; 
and if the amount were then donated back to the organization, the 
net tax effect would be zero.11 In addition, when the testimony is 
given in the federal courts, statutory witness fees and mileage are 
taxable costs,12 but the amount of compensation of expert witnesses 
is generally not taxable.13 
III. THE AVAILABILITY AND CONDUCT OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURES 
The conduct of an environmental litigation is governed, perhaps 
even more than is the conduct of most other litigations, by the 
availability of discovery proceedings-depositions on oral examina-
tion, inspection of documents and physical objects, and written 
interrogatories. The conservationists' Ia-wyers should therefore make 
as efficient and effective use of the various discovery proceedings as is 
possible; the protectors, in other words, have a real need for the 
discovery procedures. This need for discovery is caused primarily by 
the tremendous inequality of knowledge, between the conservation 
organization and the governmental agency or other resource user or 
developer, concerning the project under examination. The moun-
tains of studies, plans, and relevant files usually are all in possession 
of or controlled by the resource user. The hard evidentiary facts are 
often buried deep in the platitudinous gobbledygook in which 
bureaucrats specialize-a process in which the personnel of agencies 
dealing with resources seem to approach perfection. 
Obtaining the hard evidence prior to trial is of special concern 
in connection with conservationsts' expert testimony, because only 
with those facts can the experts' affirmative testimony be prepared. 
If the litigation is a plenary action, the conservationist group is 
typically the plaintiff, and its case must therefore be presented first.14 
11. Rev. R'ul. 67-236, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 103. 
12. See Baxter & Bros. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 F.R.D. 49 (D. Me. 1968). 
13. See Firtag v. Gendleman, 152 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1957). 
14. In an administrative proceeding, however, the case of the project proponent 
is generally presented first. If at all possible, a gap of time should be secured be-
tween the examination and cross-examination of the proponent's witnesses and the 
presentation of the objector's case. In the Storm King proceedings, adequate data 
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Without discovery proceedings, the very persons who would be 
examined on pre-trial depositions may have to be called as plaintiff's 
·witnesses; and although under most present-day procedural codes 
one is not bound by the statements of one's own witness if that 
witness is hostile,15 nevertheless learning the facts by day and pre-
paring the testimony of one's expert by night is not an efficient 
method of trial preparation. Therefore, at the very earliest point in 
preparing the case-even before the proceeding is brought, and as 
an important factor in determining whether the proceeding should 
be brought-the fawyer should ascertain the availability of discovery 
proceedings. 
In a judicial proceeding, if there is a choice between some type 
of special proceeding and a plenary action, the general availability 
of discovery in the plenary action is almost enough, in and of it-
self, to dictate choosing that form of action. The rules governing 
proceedings before most federal agencies dealing with the regulation 
of resources do not permit discovery as a matter of right, although 
they do authorize applications for discovery.16 In such proceedings, 
however, discovery can often be obtained on an informal basis, en-
couraged by a hearing examiner who realizes the great savings in 
time. For example, in the proceedings involved in Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC11 (the Storm King litigation), a vast 
amount of data was disclosed by the applicant outside of any formal 
discovery proceedings on a voluntary basis or under gentle prodding 
by the hearing examiner.18 In many cases the time factor may ap-
preciably limit the use and value of discovery proceedings for the 
preparation of the testimony of expert witnesses. Whatever the dis-
position of the preliminary injunction motion that is usually made 
(because the injunction action is typically commenced in the very 
shadow of the bulldozer blades), the trial is generally expedited in 
environmental cases, and the time for discovery and all other trial 
preparation is severely abbreviated. In Citizens Committee for the 
concerning several important aspects of the project were not secured until the appli• 
cant's direct examination was over and cross-examination completed. Because under 
the rules of the Federal Power Commission, 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(£),(g), 1.22 (1970), the 
objectors' prepared direct testimony is generally required to be submitted before any 
cross-examination, some of the objectors' most effective technical presentations were 
made on rebuttal. 
15. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 43(b). 
16. See, e.g., FPC R. PRAc. &: P., 18 C.F.R. § 1.24 (1970). 
17. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
18. See generally J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 313-59 (1967). 
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Hudson Valley v. Volpe19 (the Hudson River Expressway cases), 
for instance, the rapid sequence of activity-preliminary-injunction 
motions, appeals from their denial, the court of appeals' affirmance 
with direction that a trial begin in four weeks, depositions on almost 
a day-to-day basis, pretrial hearings and motions, and trial itself-
severely limited both the efficacy of the discovery proceedings and 
the use at trial of testimony elicited through discovery.20 The pre-
sentation of plaintiffs' case was to some extent a continuation of the 
discovery process, since some of plaintiffs' main witnesses were offi-
cials of the defendant governmental agency. Because judicial pro-
ceedings are generally expedited in environmental cases, then, the 
lawyer must be ready to prepare his case quickly and effectively. 
If he is not ready and has not prepared all of his strategy, the fast-
moving sequence of judicial events will almost certainly cause his 
case to be presented in an incoherent and incomplete fashion. 
In this connection, there are two useful techniques which plain-
tiffs' counsel can use in launching discovery almost simultaneously 
with the commencement of the action. Both are based on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The first is to secure, ex parte, an order 
permitting the taking of depositions before the CTV'entieth day after 
commencement of an action.21 The second is to make use of dis-
covery by interrogatories to parties from and after the eleventh day 
after commencement of an action.22 Discovery for the purpose of 
determining the necessity of a preliminary-injunction motion may 
19. 297 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., No. 33,371 (2d Cir. March 19, 1969) (motion 
for preliminary injunction); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. 
Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (motion to dismiss); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley 
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970) 
(permanent injunction) [hereinafter Hudson River Expressway cases]. 
20. In the Hudson River Expressway litigation, the following activities were com-
pressed into a five-month period: the making, briefing, and argument of preliminary 
motions; the talcing, briefing, and argument of appeals from denial of the preliminary 
injunction motions; the taking of extensive depositions; the briefing and argument of 
a number of other jurisdictional motions; several pretrial hearings; the working out 
of a pretrial order; and a five-week trial. 
21. See, e.g., Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 14 
F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1953). This technique will be unnecessary for plaintiffs in the 
federal district courts upon the effectuation of new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(d) on July 1, 1970. See notes 22, 25 infra. 
22. See Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
1949); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.09 (2d ed. 1969 rev.). But see recently 
amended FED. R. ClV, P. 33, effective July 1, 1970, which permits service of interrog-
atories upon defendants, without leave of court, with or after the service of the sum-
mons and complaint on the defendant. The techniques described in the text ac-
companying notes 21 and 22, however, will remain quite useful in actions brought in 
state courts. See note 25 infra, 
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be permitted upon the institution of an action,23 and discovery to 
secure information to place before the court on such a motion would 
also seem proper.24 
In any event, the drastic shortening of the procedure does ease 
one problem of plaintiffs generally-the fact that under many codes 
of civil procedure defendants have priority in the taking of deposi-
tions. 25 As a result of the shortened procedure in environmental 
cases, depositions are generally scheduled on the basis of the availa-
bility of witnesses and the convenience of counsel, rather than ac-
cording to the priority gained by the first service of a notice. 
The conservationist lawyer, in employing discovery techniques in 
order to gain the information necessary to prepare the testimony of 
his own experts may wish to conduct a pretrial examination of the 
opposition's experts. Such examination is very limited, since the 
usual rule in the federal courts requires a showing of good cause 
and special circumstances.26 However, the recent trend is toward 
liberalization of this rule,27 and what was said in a federal-condem-
nation case concerning the necessity of examining the government's 
expert witnesses should also apply to environmental litigations in 
which the opposition's experts are governmental officials or other 
witnesses testifying for the government: 
I am inclined to think that such necessity or justification is implicit 
in every eminent domain case. There is nothing sacred about the 
rights of the government in eminent domain proceedings. The gov-
ernment ought to be as frank, fair and honest with its citizens as 
it requires its citizens to be with it.28 
23. See Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ. No. 70,105 (D.S.C., filed 
Feb. 10, 1970). 
24. See Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ. No. 70,105 (D.S.C., filed 
Feb. 10, 1970). 
25. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 26; N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:10-1; N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAW 
§ 3106(a) (1970). 
Federal Ruic 26, and Rules 29-37, have all been recently amended, and will become 
effective in July 1970. These new rules will greatly liberalize present federal discovery 
practice; for example, amended rule 26 will permit plaintiffs to have priority or to 
make discovery simultaneously witli defendants. See Advisory Committee's Note to 
Rule 26, 43 F.R.D. 236-37 (1968); Doskow, Procedural Aspects of Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 
498, 501-03 (1969). 
26. See Cox v. Fennelly, 40 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lewis v. United Airlines 
Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940). But see amended FED. R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(4), effective July 1970; Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26, 43 F.R.D. 233-35 
(1968). 
27. See Sanford Constr. Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 
465 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 
1966); amended FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), effective July 1970. 
28. United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1965). 
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In this regard, however, it has been held that only the factual por-
tions of the testimony or report of an adverse party's expert may 
be discovered, and not his opinions or conclusions per se.29 Never-
theless, the opinions or conclusions of the governmental agency's 
expert are frequently embodied in the reports or brochures issued 
in promotion of the project, and such reports are very handy out-
lines for questioning. In general, it can safely be said that the ordi-
nary limitations on the pretrial discovery of an adverse party's ex-
perts are much weaker in environmental litigation than they are in 
most commercial or tort actions. This difference is in part based on 
the pressure of time, under which the judge may find that the sim-
plest means of expedition is to rely on a liberal scope-of-discovery 
rule. 
IV. PREPARING THE WITNESS' DIRECT TESTIMONY 
A. The Conservationists' Own Expert 
To the extent that there are special problems in the preparation 
of the direct testimony of experts in environmental litigation, those 
problems relate more to the substance of the litigation than to the 
procedure. The necessity that the attorney be as expert as, or more 
expert than, the expert, the importance of the collection and ready 
availability of the materials upon which the testimony is based, the 
existence or nonexistence of a rule rendering it necessary to elicit 
expert opinions by the traditional hypothetical question, 30 and most 
of the other advice found in trial practice guides, all apply to en-
vironmental litigations just as they apply to other actions. The spe-
cial problems stem primarily from the fact that the subject matters 
of the expert testimony in environmental cases often involve ques-
tions of aesthetics. 
A threshold problem in this area is that most expert witnesses 
testifying on behalf of conservationists in environmental cases are 
not professional witnesses, and for many it may be their first experi-
ence in an adversary litigation, although they may have frequently 
29. United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77 
(E.D.N.Y. 1962); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 
1962); Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 386 (D. Colo. 
1955). But see amended FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) ("Discovery of facts known and 
opinions held by experts . . • may be obtained • • . .'). 
30. See, e.g., N.J. EVIDENCE R. 58; N.Y. CIV. PRAc. I.Aw § 4515 (1970), both of which 
render hypothetical questions unneccessary. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a), under which 
"the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence," as between the rules 
of evidence applied in federal courts of equity prior to 1938 or the rules of the state 
in which the federal court is held, governs the reception of the evidence. 
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been "witnesses" at legislative hearings. Thus, a special effort must 
be made to explain to them the difference between the two types of 
hearings. 
The Storm Kirig litigation is perhaps the best example of the 
problems which the existence of aesthetic questions can cause in an 
environmental case. In that case, a citizens' conservation group op-
posed the grant of a license by the Federal Power Commission to 
the applicant, Consolidated Edison Company, to build a pumped-
storage reservoir at Storm King Mountain. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing the grant of the li-
cense, remanded the proceedings to the Commission. The nature 
of the proceedings to be held on remand was outlined in the now 
classic language of Circuit Judge Paul R. Hays: 
The Commisison's renewed proceedings must include as a basic 
concern the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic 
shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a 
project is only one of several factors to be considered.31 
The court's direction as to the nature of the renewed proceedings 
required an appraisal and analysis of the scenic beauty and of the 
place in history of Storm King Mountain and the surrounding area, 
for only by such an appraisal and analysis could the "basic concern" 
of "the preservation of natural beauty and of national historic 
shrines" be properly considered alongside the "cost of [the] pro-
ject."32 Such measurement of natural beauty and the balancing of 
it against purely economic considerations has been, and probably 
will be, involved in most environmental cases. The primary duty 
of the expert witness, then, is to persuade the court that the aes-
thetic qualities of the natural resource in question are so great that 
any destruction of those qualities, for whatever practical or economic 
reason, will leave society worse off. The expert witness must con-
vince the court that aesthetic values outweigh the practical economic 
reasons for any project which threatens the nation's natural re-
sources. 
In the Storm King litigation, for example, the scenic beauty 
could not be measured quantitatively. Nor, however, could it be 
31. 354 F.2d at 624. Under § 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190 (Jan. I, 1970), the same "basic concern" may be a require-
ment in every significant resource determination by a federal agency. This con-
tention is now before the court in Hiltonhead Fishing Co-op, Inc. v. BASF Corp., Civ. 
No. 70,105 (filed Feb. 10, 1970), pending in the federal district court in South Caro• 
lina. 
32. 354 F .2d at 620. 
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claimed to be a purely subjective matter, for there would then be 
no standard by which the Commission or a court could hold Storm 
King Mountain to be more worthy of preservation than any other 
acreage which any person held particularly dear. Thus, it became 
the task of the two active intervenors opposing the project, the 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference and the Sierra Club, to 
prove, under the ordinary rules of evidence, the degree of natural 
beauty of Storm King. It required development of a theory and 
technique for which, so far as the attorneys for the two organizations 
could ascertain, there was no precedent; in no prior litigation known 
to them was there the problem of ascertaining the value to an 
"affluent society" of a landscape and the problem of weighing that 
value against cost factors. 
Recognizing that a precise measurement was impossible, they 
attempted to develop a theory of proof which, they felt, did meet the 
demands of the court of appeals. The beginning point was a pre-
sumption of fact and of law that there do exist in this country some 
landscapes which are recognized as beyond any claims of use for 
power or other industrial purposes, except perhaps in some crisis 
not yet reached. Those landscapes are our national parks and na-
tional monuments. Absent some national emergency graver than any 
yet posed, no Federal Power Commission or court would hold that 
a power plant in the Yosemite Valley could satisfy the basic require-
ment of section IO(a) of the Federal Power Act that "the project 
adopted . . • shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission 
will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or de-
veloping a watenvay or watenvays .... "33 
The Hudson Highlands are not located within any national 
park and no serious proposal has been made to create a national park 
in that area. But proof that their beauty is as unique as that of 
areas such as Yosemite, the Olympic Mountains, and the Great 
Smokies did not seem too difficult, in light of some basic facts 
familiar to any moderately sophisticated geography student: that 
very few rivers cut through the main chain of the Appalachian 
Mountains from Georgia all the way to Maine; that the rivers which 
do so are the most spectacular at those very points, and that the only 
river which does so at sea level and is at that point wide and deep 
enough for oceangoing vessels is the Hudson. 
The lawyers attempted to prove those facts primarily through 
33. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964). 
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the expert testimony of seven men: a leading planner and professor 
of planning, a professor of art history, a renowned cartographer, and 
four leaders in the conservation movement.34 The testimony of those 
seven experts was a mixture of eloquence and dry analysis, but it 
was all directed, in one way or another, toward the conclusion that 
the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain possesses sufficient 
scenic beauty that it should be protected against those who seek to 
use the area for an industrial enterprise.35 With a few minor por-
34. The planner was Professor Charles W. Eliot, 2d, of Harvard University; the 
professor of art history was Vincent J. Scully of Yale University; the cartographer 
was Richard Edes Harrison; and the conservation leaders were Charles Callison, David 
Brower, Richard Pough, and Anthony Wayne Smith, of the National Audubon Society, 
Sierra Club, Open Space Action Committee, and National Parks Association, respec-
tively. 
35. The testimony that was most strikingly eloquent was Professor Scully's descrip-
tion of Storm King Mountain: 
It rises like a brown bear out of the river, a dome of living granite, swelling 
with animal power. It is not picturesque in the softer sense of the word but 
awesome, a primitive bodiment of the energies of the earth. It makes the character 
of wild nature physically visible in monumental form. As such it strongly reminds 
me of some of the natural formations which mark sacred sites in Greece and 
signal the presence of the Gods; it recalls Lerna in Argolis, for example, where 
Herakles fought the Hydra, and various sites of Artemis and Aphrodite where the 
mother of the beasts rises savagely out of the water. While Breaknect Ridge across 
the river resembles the winged hill of tilted strata that looms into the Gulf of 
Corinth near Calydon. 
Hence, Storm King and Breaknect Ridge form an ideal portal for the grand 
stretch of the Hudson below them. The dome of one is balanced by the horns of 
the other; but they are both crude shapes, and appropriately so, since the urban-
istic point of the Hudson in that area lies in the fact that it preserves and embodies 
the most savage and untrammeled characteristics of the wild at the very threshold 
of New York. It can still make the city dweller emotionally aware of what he 
most needs to know: that nature still exists, with its own laws, rhythms, and 
powers, separate from human desires. 
Record at 4888-89, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Project No. 2338 
(FPC 1967) [hereinafter Record I]. 
The clearest and most direct opinion was rendered by Mr. Callison: 
The Hudson River from its origin to the sea is a river of great beauty. Where 
it flows through the Highlands, from the breath-taking gateway at Storm King 
Mountain to Dunderberg downstream, the scenery from the river, or from either 
shore, is supreme. In my opinion this is the most beautiful stretch of river 
scenery in the United States. 
Record I, at 4786. The supremacy of the scenic beauty of the Hudson at Storm King 
is directly related, said Mr. Callison, "to the dominant geological feature of eastern 
United States, the Appalachian Mountains.'' Id. The Hudson Gorge, he said, "is one of 
very few places where the main chain of the Appalachians is broken by a river." 
Record I, at 4787. Finally, he compared the Hudson to the other rivers cutting 
through the Appalachian Mountains: 
Moreover none of the other rivers has the history, the drama of the Hudson. 
None has been as much the very waterway of history, the gateway to the north 
and west, the "northwest passage" to an empire, if not to the Orient as Henry 
Hudson thought it might be. In short, the Highlands and Storm King Mountain 
are unique topographical and scenic features, not only in the East, but in the 
entire country. In the far West there are rivers that run through deeper gorges, 
the Colorado, the Snake, the Yellowstone, the Salmon, and the Columbia to name 
a few. But none of them, except perhaps the Columbia, is so great a river of 
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tions of the prepared testimony being stricken on motion, the ex-
perts' testimony was admitted. 
The preparation and introduction of such expert testimony, 
aimed at preserving aesthetic value by balancing aesthetic qualities 
against bare economic facts, poses some special problems under 
three traditional rules governing expert testimony. Although those 
rules have been subject to attack in recent years, they do have some 
ongoing vitality. But if there is one area in which they should be 
inapplicable, it is the area of environmental litigation. 
One such rule is that expert testimony on the matter directly 
in issue is inadmissible, particularly if the issue is a mixed one of 
fact and law.36 In the Storm King litigation, the degree of scenic 
beauty of Storm King Mountain was a matter placed directly in 
issue by the court of appeals. Nevertheless, the testimony of the ex-
perts was received over objections based upon this traditional rule. 
An even more basic and ultimate issue of fact and of law in the 
Storm King litigation was whether the project "will be best adapted 
to a comprehenve plan for improving or developing ... " the water-
way-the Hudson River and Valley.37 Yet the expert testimony, both 
of the applicants' witnesses and of the opposing intervenors' wit-
nesses, was received in the form of answers to almost that very ques-
tion-whether the project "will be best adapted to [such] a com-
prehensive plan." 
A second traditional rule is that expert testimony is not admis-
sible if it deals with matters of common knowledge.38 It has been 
argued in environmental cases, including the Storm King and Hud-
son River Expressway cases, that the beauty of a mountain or a 
river, or of a highway, is a matter of common knowledge; and that 
any truck driver, as well as the foremost conservationist, is entitled 
history, of commerce, and of empire, connecting great mountains and wilderness 
witll a great city and seaport at its moutll. 
Record I, at 4789. 
36. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935); United States v. Robert, 192 
F.2d 893, 897-98 (5tll Cir. 1951); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 308 U.S. 550 (1939); But see Padgett v. Soutllern Ry., 396 F.2d 303 (6tll Cir. 
1968); Cameron v. New York Life Ins. Co., 301 F.2d 208 (6tll Cir. 1962). 
37. See Federal Power Act § lO(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964). See text accompanying 
note 33 supra. 
38. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962); Webb v. Fuller Brush Co., 
378 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1967); Sternberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of Nortll America, 364 
F.2d 266 (5tll Cir. 1966); Noah v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 225 N.Y. 284, 122 N.E. 235 
(1919). But see Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467 (7tll Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 
(1967); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
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to his opinion.39 Countering such arguments without the appearance 
of condescension or conceit is a problem. Moreover, the problem is 
not solved even when the testimony is received. Theories must be 
advanced under which that testimony will be granted due weight 
by the hearing examiner or by the trial judge. One such theory was 
advanced by Richard Pough, an expert for the opposing intervenors 
in the Storm King litigation,40 although that theory cannot at the 
present time be said to be accepted since the hearing examiner rec-
ommended the grant of Consolidated Edison's application.41 The 
theory is that beauty created by nature is equal in value to, and is 
to be accorded reverence equal to that of, the beauty of music, art, 
or poetry, and that experts should be available to testify to degrees 
of natural beauty just as they are able to testify to the quality of 
mortals' art. From this premise it follows that the traditional rule 
concerning expert evidence on matters of common knowledge 
should no more exclude the testimony of Professor Vincent Scully, 
an art history professor, concerning Storm King-or preclude attach-
ing substantial weight to that testimony-than it should do so to the 
testimony of Leonard Bernstein on the value of a work of music, 
being litigated perhaps in an estate tax proceeding.42 
A third traditional rule governing expert testimony can hardly 
be fairly applied in environmental litigation. That rule is that the 
facts upon which an opinion is based must be established by evi-
dence.43 This rule, of course, has several qualifications in ordinary 
nonenvironmental litigation. An expert surely may, for example, 
rely on any facts which are of such a nature that the court itself may 
take judicial cognizance of them, and he may also rely on reports 
not in evidence if such reliance is in accord with the practice of 
his profession.44 In environmental cases, however, none of the quali-
39. See Brief for Applicant Consolidated Edison Co., In re Consolidated Edison Co. 
of New York, Inc., Project No. 2338 (FPC, filed Aug. 4, 1967). 
40. R'ecord I, at 14,786. 
41. Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York, Inc., Project No. 2338 (FPC Aug. 6, 1968). 
42. Cf. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 690, 208 P .2d 1 (1949) (valua-
tion of play). 
43. See Grand Island Grain Co. v. Roush Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 391 F.2d 35 (8th 
Cir. 1968); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1967); Henkel v. Varner, 
138 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Mozer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 
1942). But see Grain Dealers Natl. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726 (5th 
Cir. 1951); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Muldowney, 130 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1942), 
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943). 
44. Jenkins v. U.S., 307 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. City Ice Co., 273 
F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1960); Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954); 
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fications generally available really support the admissibility or 
weight of expert testimony. An example of such testimony is that 
of Richard Pough in the Storm King case. The issue involved arose 
out of literally hundreds of pages of expert testimony, adduced by 
both sides; and it concerned the precise degree of visibility of the 
project works from many different angles and locations, in all sea-
sons, at all times of day and night, and in all weather. Mr. Pough 
testified that any such mathematical computations were not im-
portant. The issue, he said, was the "integrity of the Mountain" 
itself,411 that is, the integrity of the mountain to those who observe 
it. Was it to be interpreted as a demonstration of the scientific, judi-
cial, and political prowess of the Consolidated Edison Company or 
as a uniquely beautiful creation of nature?46 If Mr. Pough was to 
testify on this issue, his testimony could hardly have been based on 
facts established by evidence. 
B. The Adverse Party's Employee 
The preparation of the direct testimony of one's own expert is 
a cooperative process between expert and lawyer; and there is no 
problem of adversity of interest, although sometimes there are 
clashes of temperaments and techniques. The adverse party's expert, 
on the other hand, cannot generally be called for direct testimony, 
because an expert may not be compelled, against his will, to render 
expert testimony.47 Of course, an adverse party's expert may be sub-
Baltimore American Ins. Co. of New York v. Pecos Mercantile Co., 122 F.2d 143 
(10th Cir. 1941). 
45. Record I, at 14,786. 
46. The issue was summarized as follows in the brief submitted by this writer on 
behalf of the Sierra Club: 
It is this character and "integrity of the Mountain" and the surrounding areas, 
that must be borne in mind in determining the extent to which the Project, and 
all that goes with it, will mar the natural beauty of Storm King and its environs. 
If its meaning is changed, in the eyes of those who behold it, its supreme value 
as a preserver and embodiment of the spirit of the New World •.. to a whole 
nation, particularly the vast millions in its greatest metropolitan area, is forever 
lost. In that event, no combination of orders of this Commission, funds of the 
applicant, and skill of its eminent landscape architects, can be any more success-
ful in putting the earth, rocks and trees of Storm King back together again, than 
were all the king's horses and all the king's men in the case of Humpty Dumpty. 
Painting concrete green cannot deceive its beholders into believing that it is the 
handkerchief of the Lord, and, if it can, this Commission should not, in the absence 
of some overwhelming economic necessity, direct such deception. 
Brief for Intervenor, In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Project No. 
23!18, at 26 (FPC, filed Aug. 14, 1967). 
47. Cold Metal Process Co., v. United Engr. &: Foundry Co., 83 F. Supp. 914, 917 
(W .D. Pa. 19!18). This problem is different from the one discussed above with regard to 
the pretrial examination of the opposition's expert witnesses who will testify for it. 
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poenaed,48• but again he cannot be compelled to give an expert 
opinion on direct examination.49 In the ordinary commercial or 
tort litigation in which expert testimony is needed, these rules cause 
little hardship, for each side secures its own expert, who is well able 
to study the subject matter. I£ that expert must inspect documents, 
physical objects, or lands, the discovery process is available.00 How-
ever, in environmental litigation in which the legality of a large 
public-works project is at issue, lack of finances, lack of time, and 
physical factors all generally prevent the plaintiffs from getting the 
materials or data for their experts to study.51 Yet in such cases ex-
perts who are employees of the governmental agency being sued 
have the requisite information and, in addition, frequently have 
opinions which, wrong or right, are at variance with the positions 
taken by the agency heads.52 Assuming that the knowledge and 
opinions of such experts are as much the property of the plaintiffs, 
whom we grace with the good name "taxpayers," as they are the 
property of the defendants, it seems that that knowledge and those 
opinions should be equally available to both parties. Accordingly, the 
conservationists' la,;vyers should be permitted not only to subpoena 
experts employed by the government, but to compel them to give 
expert testimony. 
These problems, of course, may not arise if the government's 
expert is willing to give his opinion despite the fact that it might 
be used in opposition to positions taken by his employer; but such 
situations are understandably quite rare.53 Moreover, even if the 
See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. The situation here arises when the conserva-
tionists' lawyer wishes to call an employee of an adverse party-usually the govern-
ment-to testify for the conservationists on direct examination. 
48. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Mattson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 
43 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Ohio 1967). 
49. See note 47 supra. 
50. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 34. Rule 34, as amended effective July 1970, will be 
considerably easier to apply in procedure and broader in scope. See Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Rule 34, 43 F.R.D. 256-57 (1968). 
51. See text preceding and accompanying notes 14-15 supra. 
52. This situation is particularly true in environmental cases in which employees 
of a governmental agency may be conservationists themselves and have opinions 
diametrically opposed to the position of their employer. Such was the case with regard 
to John Clark, an expert witness in the Hudson River Expressway cases. See note 54 
infra. 
53. Such a situation has occurred only once in this writer's trial experience. See 
note 54 infra. But as environmental litigation increases, the fact that numerous agency 
employees are conservationists (see note 52 supra) may lead them to give testimony for 
the plaintiffs under subpoena, even though that testimony may be opposed to the 
agency's position. 
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situation does occur, the expert in an environmental case generally 
needs time to prepare his opinion, and yet it may be unethical for 
the plaintiffs' attorneys to confer with an adversary's employee prior 
to trial in order to inform him as to what he will be asked on direct 
examination. 54 This problem, as well as the more usual one in which 
the government's expert is unwilling to give his opinion on direct 
examination, can be solved by allowing the plaintiffs' la·wyers to 
examine the subpoenaed expert both before trial55 and on direct 
examination during trial. 
V. PREPARING EXPERT WITNESSES FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION 
It has already been pointed out that the expert witness, who 
may have testified many times before legislative bodies on matters 
54. This problem was demonstrated graphically in the Hudson River Expressway 
cases. At issue in those cases, although not determined because of the resolution of 
the cases on other issues, was the impact of the project upon the fish in and around 
the area of the Hudson River to be filled in. Defendants' position was that the impact 
would be small; plaintiffs alleged that it would be substantial and adverse. Plaintiffs 
had neither the finances nor the other resources necessary to prove their allegation; 
but they claimed that the governmental agencies involved, both state and federal, had 
never adequately ascertained the impact because they had not measured the abundance 
of fish in the area. Plaintiffs subpoenaed John Clark who was the head of an agency 
of the Department of the Interior-a defendant in the actions-and asked him to 
testify as to the kind of study necessary, in his opinion, to determine adequately the 
impact of the project upon the fish. Clark, who was willing to give his opinion even 
though it might have been used against the position of the Department, testified that 
[t]he information that would be necessary to plan a research program to evaluate 
the effect of this project would require assembling all background information 
available from previous studies of the river and would require planning, suitable 
inventory and collection of additional specific information to come up with a 
scientific opinion as to the effect of this, and in addition there would have to be 
11:ore information put at the disposal of the people doing the research and plan-
nmg. 
Record at 1763, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afjd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970) [hereinafter Record II]. At 
that point the court interrupted the testimony to question the plaintiffs' attorney: 
THE COURT: I am just wondering about the fairness of this. Have you talked 
with the witness before, and did you tell him that you were going to ask him his 
expert opinion on the matters? 
MR. SIVE: I have not talked to the witness, your Honor, beyond just telling 
him that I would subpoena him here. 
THE COURT: I know, but don't you think it is a little unfair to call a man 
~hf is expert in the. field and not tell him_ what he is going to be asked, whether 
it _is n~cessary for him to do more work m order to form an opinion? I would 
think 1t must take men much longer to determine the nature and scope of a 
project than just the two minutes on the stand. • .• 
MR. SIVE: Your Honor, I might state that I deliberately forebore conferring 
with the witness because he is an employee of the Department of Interior which is 
an adverse party. 
THE COURT: All I am saying is you are asking him for his opinion as an 
expert without warning him what he was going to be asked, and my experience 
is that you have to give these men time. 
Record II, at 1764-65. 
55. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. 
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involved in an environmental litigation, should be made aware of 
the exact nature of an adversary proceeding.56 It is also unnecessary 
to dwell at any length here on the instructions given to witnesses 
generally-to answer simply and truthfully, not to argue, not to 
regard cross-examination as a game of wits, not to attempt to figure 
out whether an answer will be· helpful or harmful, and to leave 
strategy and tactics to the lawyers. 
What remains, then, is to examine the special problems of the 
expert witness in environmental litigation. One of the most signifi-
cant of those problems involves the degree to which opposing coun-
sel will attempt to portray the witness as a composite of several 
objects of derision, among which are the feminized male, the un-
worldly sentimentalist, the professor who has never met a payroll, 
the enemy of the poor who need more kilowatts and hard goods, 
and the intellectual snob. For example, on cross-examination in the 
Hudson River Expressway cases, an expert cartographer was asked 
questions which were intended to show that he had been biased 
against the project in question before the litigation began, that he 
was a professional conservationist, that he was opposed to any inter-
ference whatsoever with nature, and that he was against all forms 
of indoor recreation.57 Similarly, in the Storm King litigation, an 
expert for the intervenors opposing the project was asked questions, 
and gave answers, which portrayed him as a professional conserva-
tionist. 58 He was also referred to as a public-relations man on the 
basis of his answers to questions concerning his past. 59 The extent 
to which the conservationists' experts may have to be cross-examined 
56. See text following note 13 supra. 
57. In this regard, the following colloquy occurred during the cross-examination of 
the expert witness: 
Q: What are your feelings and opinions on recreation centers in Central Park? 
A: There is one recreation center which we successfully opposed about ten 
years ago, which was a building in the ramble designed for the recreation of 
older people, 55 year old respectable people, and it involved ,putting a IO-foot-an 
8-foot chain link fence around the whole core of the ramble and providing a 
structure which would have the usual facilities, snack bar, restaurants, plus a 
radio room, television room, and a record-playing room. We deemed that this was 
not proper use for a park because a park was for outdoor recreation and not 
indoor recreation. 
We oppose all forms of indoor recreation. 
THE COURT: In Central Park. 
THE WITNESS: Anywhere. 
THE COURT: Anywhere! 
Record II, at 1830. Plaintiff's counsel found it necessary, on redirect examination, to 
have the witness explain that his opposition to "indoor recreation" was to such recrea-
tion "anywhere" in Central Park, and not to indoor recreation anywhere at all. 
58. Record I, at 18,254. 
59. Record I, at 12,720. 
May 1970] Expert Witnesses 1195 
as to their opinions, backgrounds, and associations can be a definite 
deterrent to their willingness to testify, particularly because the 
appeal to testify is made generally with the equivalent of merit 
badges rather than with hard dollars. The expert witness must 
therefore be warned of the possible tacks of cross-examination to 
which he may be subjected and he must be reminded to keep calm 
no matter what direction the questioning takes. 
Nevertheless, the probing into the opinions and past activities 
and associations of conservationists' experts is largely justified under 
ordinary rules of evidence. An expert's expertise may be im-
peached, 00 and the bases of his opinion are a fair field for question-
ing. 61 Moreover, when the subject matter of an expert opinion is 
the balancing of natural beauty against super-highways, rather than 
the permanency of a knee injury, the cross-examiner has far greater 
latitude than he normally does. The fact that this latitude poses 
tactical problems for the conservationists' counsel, and perhaps even 
civil liberties problems, is just one more of a whole new set of 
problems to be dealt with by conservationists' Ia-wyers on a case-by-
case basis. 
Another special problem which almost all conservationists' ex-
perts must meet on cross-examination is what may be called the 
"wilderness problem." It involves defending a defense of Storm 
King Mountain, Mineral King, or Central Park, against charges 
that conservationists would tum Times Square itself into a rain 
forest or that they are hypocrites for riding automobiles or airplanes. 
On cross-examination by a good trial la'w-yer that defense is difficult. 
In the Hudson River Expressway cases, for example, plaintiffs' ex-
pert on the beauty of the Tappan Zee area of the Hudson, an emi-
inent artist, found it difficult, under cross-examination which 
featured references to the admitted existing blight of the waterfront 
in some of the areas of the proposed road, to defend halting the con-
struction of a roadway which would be much cleaner than some of 
the blighted areas.62 His answers involved subtle theories, psycho-
logical and artistic, on just when a scene may evoke feelings of 
nature's, rather than of man's, skill and intelligence. 
There is no unique solution in environmental cases to the prob-
lem of such derision of an expert witness. The lawyer should simply 
60. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Union, Co•op., 377 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 
1967); Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960); Safeway Stores, Inc. 
v. Combs, 273 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1960). 
61. Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960). 
62. Record Il, at 2046. 
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try to have the expert well-prepared to present his subtle theories 
in as articulate and as concrete language as possible. The more vague 
and ethereal such testimony is, the more likely it is that the opposi-
tion's attempts at derision will be complemented and thus fur-
thered, by the general psychological effect the witness has on the 
court. The witness, then, must have ready, in simple terms, basic 
theories of why and how man must remain a part of nature and 
nature a part of the life of man. A witness may be somewhat reas-
sured by the fact that there have been, and will be, very few, if any, 
major environmental cases tried before a jury since the remedy 
sought in plenary actions generally includes an injunction. Never-
theless, it is important to instruct an expert witness not to be con-
cerned if the cross-examining attorney indicates the deepest sadness 
or puzzlement at a statement the basic meaning of which is that man 
does not live by bread alone. 
VI. CONDUCT OF THE EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The direct testimony of the conservationists' expert witness may 
be prefiled in ·written form if the proceeding is before the Federal 
Power Commission or an agency with similar procedural rules.63 In 
such a case the first oral testimony of the witness is on cross-examina-
tion. If the expert's direct testimony is not prefiled and is given 
orally, it is best to have the questions written out beforehand, par-
ticularly the hypothetical questions when the rule prevailing in the 
jurisdiction requires that such form of questions be used in order 
to elicit expert opinions.64 In addition, although the expert should 
be instructed to answer questions fully and adequately, he must 
also be instructed not to add unnecessary detail or embellishments. 
Frequently, in environmental litigation, as in other types of 
litigation, far more can be accomplished on the cross-examination 
than on the direct. More often than not the attorney for the 
adverse party does not follow the instruction that most senior trial 
lawyers give to a young associate on his first case: in cross-examina-
tion ask questions only when you know what the answers will be. 
Indeed, as environmental cases increase in number, attorneys de-
fending the resource-using agencies or companies will probably 
63. FPC R. PRAc. & P., 18 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)(2)(iii) (1970); 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(g)(2), 
210.4(d) (1969) (Army Corps of Engineers); 10 C.F.R. § 2.741 (1969) (Atomic Energy 
Commission). 
64. Such a rule is present in only a small minority of jurisdictions. See generally 
C. McCORMICK, LAw OF EvmENCE 29-30 (1954). See also note 30 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
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cross-examine less, as they discover that their cross-examinations un-
cover information which is more helpful than harmful to the pro-
tectors' cause. 65 
On the other hand, the conservationists' lawyer's cross-examina-
tion of the expert witness of the resource-using agency or company 
can be fruitful. Such experts, particularly those engaged in planning 
or construction, still, by and large, do not understand the concept 
that some parts of the world cannot be improved or that sound 
public policy does not necessarily require that we have more of 
everything that we can build. 66 This pursuit of bigness may not be 
as dramatically expressed as it was in the words of one of the com-
pany's planning experts on cross-examination in the Storm King 
litigation when he was comparing the proposed immense storage 
reservoir to the small pond now at its proposed site; "[a]ny large 
lake," he said, "is handsomer than a small lake."67 But the philosophy 
will, in most cases, be manifested in some way which clearly poses 
the issue of what the affluent society should seek. 
Many of the experts cross-examined in environmental cases are, 
of course, physical scientists, economists, bridge builders, or others 
whose field does not embrace any of the broad issues involving the 
use of resources. In cross-examining such experts, there is no special 
technique peculiar to environmental litigations. A special problem 
does exist: money. The conservationists' attorney more often than 
65. Charles Callison, a prominent conservationist, was cross-examined at length 
at the Storm King hearings at which he gave the testimony quoted in note 35 supra. 
This writer correctly predicted that on the second occasion on which he testified-at 
hearings involving a claim by New York City of danger to the city's aqueducts-he 
would not be cross-examined at all. 
66. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). 
In the Storm King case, the court of appeals held that renewed proceedings must 
include as a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and of natural 
historic shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a project 
is only one of several factors to be considered. 
354 F .2d at 624. 
In the second case, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Commission 
had failed to consider a question beyond the question of federal versus private devel-
opment. The question not considered was "the question whether any dam should be 
constructed." 387 U.S. at 436. See also Olpin, Book Review, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1315 
(1970). 
67. Record I, at 14,720. Nor may the philosophy of improvement of everything by 
engineering be stated as clearly as it was in the following colloquy on cross-examina-
tion of a planner of the Storm King project: 
Q: Have you ever in your experience found an area which you decided was 
so beautiful that you didn't think that you could improve it? 
A: Personally I think practically anything can be improved. In my past ex-
perience I have not had any area which wasn't improved or something like that. 
Record I, at 7505. 
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not is unable to afford to have his expert with him either as the 
testimony is given or even that evening. The principal solution lies, 
again, in securing as much information as possible in the discovery 
proceedings. While the oral deposition of the expert himself may not 
be permitted, 68 the conservationists' attorney can make use of inter-
rogatories and inspection of documents to secure most of the factual 
information which will be given and discussed in the testimony.69 
The task of the conservationists' attorney is not unlike that of the 
attorney for the stockholder-plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative ac-
tion, and many of such attorneys' techniques may be borrowed for 
use in the even more uphill struggle against "progress." 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We are only at the threshold of the development of environ-
mental law and of techniques in environmental litigation. Perhaps 
all that can be really set out with assurance is a summary of the 
task of the conservationists' lawyer in cases which have involved, and 
will involve, the weighing of the material against the aesthetic in the 
affluent society.70 The task may be simply stated as that of proving, 
without any revolutionary changes in the rules of evidence, what 
was said in the mid-nineteenth century by the conservationists' favo-
rite nonlegal authority, Henry David Thoreau, in his Walden: 
Most of the luxuries, and many of the so called comforts of life, are 
not only indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of 
mankind.71 
Many courts have now reached the stage of development at which 
they may permit litigation of the question of what does truly aid 
"the elevation of mankind." 
68. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. But see text accompanying notes 
27-29 supra. 
69. For problems in this area, see text accompanying notes 16-25 supra. 
70. This is, in essence, the test established by the court of appeals in the Storm 
King litigation, and also perhaps the test established by § 102 of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 Gan. 1, 1970). See note 
31 supra and accompanying text. 
71. At 12 (B. Atkinson ed. 1950). 
